One could say follow the energy to understand how the balance will shift east of Europe in this unfolding 2026. Follow the flows of energy, and of the key materials of the twin transition, to take the measure of the tightening alliance between Russia and China.
Before 2022 more than 40 percent of Russian gas was directed to the European Union, with long-term contracts and higher average prices than today. After the aggression against Ukraine that channel closed and Russia had to quickly rebuild the map of its trade interests. It did so by looking almost exclusively to the East.
In 2024, bilateral trade between Russia and China reached $237 billion. This marks a historic turning point, but it should be read in conjunction with another key number: today, more than 30 percent of Russian exports go to China, while Russia accounts for only 3-5 percent of China’s total foreign trade.
This is the heart of the imbalance. For Moscow, Beijing has become a vital partner. For Beijing, Moscow is an important but not irreplaceable supplier. The slowdown experienced in 2025-with trade declining around 9 percent year-on-year in the first ten months-does not change the structure of the relationship: Russian economic dependence remains intact.
Gas and oil: the timeline of an addiction
It is on energy that the entanglement is most obvious. In 2023, gas exports through the Power of Siberia pipeline exceeded 20 billion cubic meters. In 2024 they continued to grow. And in 2025, Russia’s state-owned Gazprom pumped about 38.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China, even exceeding the annual contracted capacity of 38 billion and marking a nearly 20 percent increase over 2024. On oil, the path has been similar: within three years China has become the main outlet for Russian crude oil, absorbing nearly half of the exports, more than 2.3 million barrels per day between pipelines and sea routes.
Russian supplies to China take place on significantly less favorable terms than in the European past, with average revenues estimated to be 30 to 40 percent lower per unit of energy. Volumes grow, margins thin. Russia sells a lot, but collects, proportionately,less.
This balance of power becomes evident in Siberia. An immense territory, inhabited by 36-37 million people, about a quarter of Russia’s population, compared with the size comparable to that of a continent. Just across the border, in the Chinese provinces of Manchuria and the Northeast, live about 90 million people. It is a structural pressure: natural resources, space and labor shortages on the one hand; population, capital and industrial demand on the other.
There are increasing numbers of Chinese nationals in Siberia today, working in infrastructure construction, mining, logistics, large-scale agriculture and services related to resource exploitation. They are there where gas pipelines, oil pipelines, railways and energy corridors pass.
Russia’s decision to introduce, between late 2025 and 2026, visa-free travel for Chinese citizens with ordinary passports for short stays should also be read in this key: to facilitate trade, business, and economic presence in increasingly China-oriented regions.
Adding to this picture is another, less visible but politically significant piece: the leasing of vast Siberian agricultural and forestry areas to Chinese operators. In recent years, especially in the Russian Far East, thousands of hectares of land have been leased on long-term leases to companies from China for intensive cultivation, livestock farming and exploitation of forest resources. Formally, these are trade agreements, not cessions of sovereignty. Essentially, however, Russia is making land and resources available, while capital, organization and supply chains remain in Chinese hands.
It is a model that responds to an immediate need of Moscow-attracting investment to depopulated regions-but further reinforces structural dependence: Siberia is increasingly becoming a productive space hooked to the Chinese economy, rather than an autonomous lever of Russian development. A process consistent with the entire trajectory of the Moscow-Beijing axis: more integration, less room for negotiation.
Power of Siberia 2
Now Gazprom and other Russian energy companies are also pushing for Power of Siberia 2, a pipeline that was intended to bring another tens of billions of cubic meters to the Chinese market. But the context has changed: Russia no longer has comparable alternatives on the table. This means that any new infrastructure consolidates exports but further reduces Moscow’s bargaining power. Once the facility is in place, flows do not easily shift.
According to internal and external analyses, including those of former Russian Central Bank advisor Alexandra Prokopenko, Russia risks a structural crisis within one to two years: weak growth, insufficient investment, and increasing technological and fiscal dependence.
Thus, 2026 becomes a year of transition. The alliance with China is not in question, but its cost in terms of autonomy emerges clearly. Moscow needs Beijing to sell gas and oil, with exports set to grow further. Beijing, on the other hand, can diversify suppliers, negotiate prices, and use energy as geopolitical leverage.
In this framework, which has been made more complex by Trump’s continued attacks that have caused the Atlantic shore to wane, Europe must decide what part to play. It has three directions that linked would become a force. An all-out trade strategy, also targeting Mercosur and Asean markets. A technology strategy based on twin transition innovation. A social strategy aimed at bringing welfare up to date by integrating it into the environmental and digital revolution to give stability and appeal to the continent. The technological tools to achieve these goals are, the political tools are not yet.
